Drumurile Europei

[dr4qul4]

Diferente enorme de pret intre Astaldi si Strabag!!!
Am impresia ca polonezii estimeaza mai putin ca la noi, iar firmele, dupa ce au avut probleme in trecut, liciteaza preturi prin care sa acopere toate riscurile.

Mai putin Astaldi si Porr care probabil au unele parghii prin care stiu ca li se vor accepta suplimentari.

Pentru ca altfel, 15,5 mil E/km, tunel pe 3 benzi, ingropat adanc sub metrou si lung de 2 km + pod pe 4 benzi? + foarte multe bretele??
Haideti sa fim seriosi, pretul nu poate fi cel real. Numai tunelul costa peste 100, poate 150 mil E.

[adiarc]

nici eu nu cred asa ceva...15 mil/km e pret de viaduct la jum din inaltimea celui de la Aciliu care a costat cam 40 de mil si are un km......
sunt curios , la ei care e principalul criteriu - cel mai mic pret , ca la noi , sau din contra - solutia tehnica ?

[Michał]

Hi!
Sorry for writing in english but i don't know romanian at all. I want to correct some mistakes connected with S2 in Warsaw.
Firstly, section you are taking about is about 4,6 km long, so that mean ca. 65 mil E/km. 18,6 km is a lenght of all 3 sections. http://forsal.pl/galerie/849048,duze-zdjecie,1,gddkia-astaldi-zlozylo-najtansza-oferte-na-budowe-odcinka-poludniowej-obwodnicy-warszawy.html
Strabag and Budimex offer is so high, because they won already 12 tenders for motorways and expressways and they give extra margin.
Astaldi also currently building metro in Warsaw so they have required equpiment.

[Ionut]

Hi Michal and welcome!
You can speak in English, no problem, we'll do our best to answer.

[dr4qul4]

65 mil.E/km is a decent price. Thank you for clarifying this mystery.

welcome to this forum.

We were also asking ourselves how GDDKIA is organized so well and has so many projects undergoing at any given time, when our national road company is 10 steps behind. 

[alecu26]

Michat, how many contracts, in general for National roads, Express roads and motorways have been signed recently?

If 12 are only for Strabag and Budimex how many for other companies? Astaldi, Salini, OHL, ..etc?

[Michał]

This is map of recently signed contracts or opened bids for construction.http://forsal.pl/galerie/830020,duze-zdjecie,1,kto-wezmie-duze-kontrakty-na-budowe-autostrad-i-tras-ekspresowych-w-polsce-mapa.html
It's for 21.10.2014. You can also add two more contracts for Strabag(S2,S8), another two for Energopol Szczecin(S12,S51), one for Rubau(S8), Gulermak(S2), Warbud(S2) and Mota (S3). So it's going to be more than 40 contracts.

[dr4qul4]

40 contracts in the same time?
And we need to wait 5 months to open the bids for 5 contracts.....

All the contracts are managed by central GDDKIA? Or there is a competion between its regional branches?

[Michał]

Yeah, most of them in the same time, majority is already signed, the rest should be signed in first half of this year.
All those tenders were announced in late 2013 and early 2014, so it took over 1 year to sign contract. For example tender for Marki bypass(S8) took almost 2 years.
Contracts are managed by regional braches of GDDKiA, but sometimes tenders are taken over by other regional branches e.g.: some section of S7 and S17 are in Warsaw region but they are taken over by Lublin and Kielce GDDKiA

[alecu26]

This is also due to the activity in the previous year. Basicly in 2013-2014....Poland was already finished with the absorbtion of money from the budget cicle 2007-2013 and they could focuse already in 2014-2020. Some contracts were in stand by...just waiting 1 Jan 2014.

Concgratulations. We are speachless.

[pasadia]

Intr-o alta stire despre drumurile Europei:

Slovacia se pregateste si ea de un proiect in PPP: D4, centura Bratislavei si o prima parte din drumul expres R7.

Government expertise says...
Building costs 1.325 billion for 59 km, which is roughly 22.4 millions per 1 km. That's ok (metropolitan area, new bridge over Danube, big interchanges, somewhere 3+3 lanes).

The problem is, the government plans a payment of 130-150 millions yearly for period of 30 years. And that's 3.9-4.5 billions all together, what is 3 times more than the building costs!!!

Sursa

si replica:

Imagine it as if the government took a mortgage and would be paying it off in the next 30 years. With a 4,5 % interest they would pay around 2x the original price in the actual money. If you would sell a 30 years bond you would pay around 3.7x times the original price in the actual money paid altogether. Ten euro now is worth ten euro and forty five cents over a year with such interest.

Money has a different value in time. We could discuss whether the interest that the PPP contractor charges is appropriate or not, but for that you would need to know more than the total payment the government will have to make.

Even if the government would borrow the money on the money market and tendered the construction and paid with the borrowed money, it would have to repay the loan with the interest. The interest easily makes the total payment two times or three times the amount of the borrowed sum.

The contractor could use its own money for the financing of the project, but this is mostly not the case. It has to take a loan. The problem with PPP is mostly in the basic fallacy that a private contractor is able to get a lower interest rate than a government. It is most of the time not true. The second problem is that the contractor will always add a surcharge to the interest rate under which it takes the loan and charge this premium to the government. Factually, there is really no way that the PPP project could be cheaper because of the financing.

The only way a PPP project could become cheaper (at least project like this, when it is financed by installments paid by the government and not directly from the toll that would be collected by the operator - i.e. total privatization of the whole motorway) is savings on the side of construction and maintenance. But almost exactly the same savings are possible when the construction and maintenance are tendered directly.

PPP projects are mainly a way how to hide actual debt of the government, not much else. As we see also in this example, it is also a way how to make the whole operation less transparent, because it harder to come to the actual data about the prices, maintenance costs, financial operations etc.

We could argue that these days the government could get its money very, very cheap (i.e. with very low interests). I am quite confident that much cheaper than any private corporation. However, governments prefer to hide their true borrowings via PPP projects.

Nu vi se pare cunoscuta discutia asta? Iar cifrelele... parca sunt mai favorabile la slovaci.
Sunt curios daca tot VINCI e favorit.

[frunzaverde]

Nu vi se pare cunoscuta discutia asta? Iar cifrelele... parca sunt mai favorabile la slovaci.

E normal sa fie mai bune la slovaci. CDS-ul (cota platita pentru asigurarea* impotriva defaultului suveran, adica a riscului de neplata a obligatiunilor nationale, adica a falimentului de stat al Slovaciei) este de 50, fata de 114 pentru Romania. Cum contractul PPP e un contract pe termen lung incheiat cu suveranul (Romania respectiv Slovacia), este clar ca riscul suveranului se va vedea in costul de finantare al PPP-ului.

In concluzie RO e vazuta de doua ori mai riscant ca SK (nu va speriati, cifrele sunt excelente pentru SK si foarte bune pentru RO), deci inseamna ca RO va plati mai scump orice imprumut ca SK.

* nu e chiar asigurare, pentru ca poti contracta un CDS fara sa detii obligatiunile propriu-zise ale statului. Bine ati venit la cazinou!

[alecu26]

practic la un pret 2/3 de constructie...costul total e jumătate.

Poate ar fi si asta o solutie...sa nu se mearga neaparat pe conceptul Vinci cu asa multe tuneluri. Mai multe poduri. Podurile sunt extrem de putine....pentru ce e acolo....pe Cobra. S-ar scadea mult investitia initiala...posibil cu o crestere a intretinerii (dar nu sunt sigur). Deci...prin efect de multiplicare, daca scadem 200 milioane (rezonabil din 1,8 miliarde) am scadea aproape 1 miliard din total.

[pasadia]

Ambassador Dell is emblematic of another concern cited by Bechtel's critics: that its Balkan road projects have blurred the line between U.S. foreign policy and the corporation's interests. Dell spoke out publicly in support of the highway project, the contract for which was signed in April 2010 — even as international institutions questioned the road's value to Kosovo. [...]

Dell left Pristina in 2012 and took another diplomatic position elsewhere, before retiring from the State Department in October 2013. The following month, Bechtel hired him as its representative in Mozambique. According to a disclosure statement Dell filed with the State Department while he was still working there, Bechtel first discussed a job offer with him in July 2012, a month before he left Kosovo and in the middle of the highway's construction.

SURSA

Faine pozele. In rest povestea pare similara.

[pasadia]

Daca nu va supara, voi continua sa va dau stiri despre drumurile Europei colectate de pe SSC:

Din colectia "Uite ca se intampla si la altii", astazi Norvegia:







Mai multe detalii si poze aici.